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Chapter 5 
 
Industrial Policy, Structure, and Locations during the Transition toward a 
Market-oriented Economy in Myanmar 
 
Toshihiro Kudo 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
This paper examines Myanmar’s industrial policy, structure, and locations during the 
transition from a centrally planned economy to a market-oriented one throughout the 1990s 
and up to the present. After the military government assumed power in 1988, it abandoned the 
socialist centrally planned economic system and began instituting a market-oriented one 
through a series of liberalization and deregulation measures, although most of which have 
stalled since 1997 and remain half-way implemented. 
Against this background, it is rather surprising that the impact of these new policies of 
international trade, finance, regulations, licensing and ownership requirements on industrial 
structure and location in Myanmar has been poorly documented and examined to date. Some 
key issues to understanding the impact and effectiveness of the market-oriented policies 
during the last two decades in Myanmar remain to be answered: Have the new trade and 
industrial policies changed the industrial structure and organizational behavior in Myanmar? 
Have they improved the performance of Myanmar’s industrial sector? Have they had any 
impact on industry location in Myanmar?  
This paper reviews the series of liberalization programs implemented under the military 
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government—the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) and the State Peace and 
Development Council (SPDC)—and assesses their impact on industrial structure and its 
spatial distribution. 
 
 
1. INDUSTRIAL POLICY: PAST AND PRESENT 
Industrialization is an essential element in the development of a country as a whole. Among 
the Third World countries newly independent after World War II, there was a desire for 
economic growth through industrialization: to transform their traditional agrarian economies 
into modern industrial ones. Economic development had often been equated with 
industrialization, and independent Myanmar shared the same aspiration for a modern 
industrial economy. However, looking at Table 1 we can clearly see the underdeveloped state 
of the industrial sector in Myanmar compared with that of neighboring countries. 
Myanmar is rich in natural resources and has a highly literate population, which are 
apparently good signs for development prospects. Its economy was slightly larger than that of 
Thailand before World War II; its exports reached $195 million, while Thailand's were only 
$76 million. Although Myanmar's economy was devastated by the war, most economic and 
development indicators show that it was not too far behind Thailand by 1950. Therefore, it 
was not at all unrealistic in the 1950s to be optimistic about Myanmar's economic prospects, 
including its rapid industrialization (Kudo [1998:7-2]). 
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Table 1 GDP by industry (%)
1980 1990 2000 2007 1980 1990 2000 2007
Myanmar 47 57 57 44 13 11 10 19
Cambodia - 56 38 32 - 11 23 27
Laos - 61 53 43 - 15 23 32
Vietnam 50 39 25 20 23 23 37 42
Primary Industry Secondary Industry
(Source) ADB, Key Indicators , various numbers.
(Note) Myanmar and Laos figures for 2007 are based on 2006.
 
 
Taking these historical facts and the natural resources endowments of Myanmar into 
consideration, the apparent explanation for economic stagnation and stunted industrialization 
lies in the industrial policies that successive governments have adopted since independence. 
Table 2 gives a brief chronology of the political economy of industrialization in Myanmar. It 
is clear that Myanmar’s governments have long clung to control-oriented, or at least 
interventionist, policies, rather than utilizing market mechanisms. 
 
Table 2: A Brief chronology of Myanmar’s political economy of industrialization 
Period Political System 
Economic 
System Industrial Strategy Result 
1.1886-1948 Colonialism Laissez-faire 
policy 
Export-propelled 
“agriculturization ” 
Foreign-dominated 
industrial sector 
Poor spread effect for 
nationwide industrial 
development 
 
2.1948-1962 
Parliamentary 
democracy 
Moderate 
economic 
nationalism in 
the framework of 
market 
mechanisms 
Raw 
material-oriented 
import substitution 
industrialization 
Moderate industrial 
performance 
Foreign-dominated 
industrial sector 
3.1962-1974 Military rule 
(Burmese 
Way to 
Socialism) 
Command 
economy, 
Radical 
nationalism, 
Burmanization 
& Strict isolation
Import Substitution 
industrialization 
Self-reliant line 
Burmanization of 
economy and 
industry 
Poor economic and 
industrial 
performance 
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4.1974-1988 BSPP rule 
(Burmese 
Way to 
Socialism) 
Centralized 
planning 
inward-looking 
policy with the 
exception of 
ODA acceptance
Import substitution 
industrialization 
Agro-based 
industries 
Inflows of ODA 
Poor economic and 
industrial 
performance 
Import-dependent 
industries 
5.1988 to 
1997 
Military rule 
(SLORC) 
Transition 
toward  market 
economy 
Open-door 
policy 
Agriculture-based & 
export-oriented 
industrialization 
Inflows of foreign 
direct investment 
Economic recovery 
Gradual increase in 
foreign and local 
private enterprises 
6.1997 to 
Present 
Military rule 
(SPDC) 
Controlled 
market economy
Natural resources 
exploitation, 
offshore gas in 
particular 
No explicit 
industrial strategy 
Stalled economic 
reforms 
Enhanced economic 
control 
Cronyism 
Source: Based on Mya Than and Joseph L.H. Tan, "Introduction: Optimism for Myanmar's 
Economic Transition in the 1990s?" in Mya Than and Joseph L.H. Tan, eds., Myanmar 
Dilemmas and Options: The Challenge of Economic Transition in the 1990s (Singapore: 
ASEAN Economic Research Unit, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1990), Appendix I, 
pp.14-15; and Maung Maung Lwin, “Industrialization of Myanmar and Economic Dynamism 
of Pacific Asia,” Kaigai-Jijo Kenkyu (Studies on Foreign Affairs), Vol.24, No.1 (Kumamoto: 
Kaigai-Jijo Kenkyu-jo, Kumamoto Gakuen University, September 1996). Major changes and 
additions are by the author. 
 
During the socialist period in particular, an inward-looking growth strategy, nationalization 
(Burmanization), and import substitution had long been pursued. However, Myanmar’s 
centrally planned economy, like other socialist countries, faced many obstacles as well as 
stagnant growth in not just the industrial sector but the economy as a whole. In the mid-1970s, 
the socialist government relaxed some its strict policies and introduced reforms for 
State-owned Economic Enterprises (SEEs) along with the prescription of commercial 
guidelines to improve their efficiency. Although the economy picked up shortly after the 
reforms, it was not sustainable, mainly due to a shortage of imported material goods. After 
1983, industrial production deteriorated again and other economic problems such as high 
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inflation, rising living costs, and macroeconomic and monetary mismanagement including 
demonetization in 1987 worsened the situation, which eventually led to the collapse of the 
socialist regime in 1988. 
Subsequently, the SLORC/SPDC officially gave up on the establishment of a socialist 
economic system and started to promote a market-oriented economy. Two pillar laws were 
promulgated: the Foreign Investment Law (FIL) in November 1988 and the State-owned 
Economic Enterprises Law (SEEs Law) in March 1989. The former resumed the intake of 
private foreign capital after a 25-year interval, and the latter authorized private enterprises to 
engage in all but 12 proscribed industries. In addition to these, various reform measures were 
taken to promote the active participation of the private sector in the national economy. These 
included the decentralization of control of economic activities, relaxation of price controls, 
deregulation of export and import restrictions, opening of border trade, reduction of 
government subsidies, announcement of full-fledged privatization of all SEEs, streamlining of 
taxes and duties, establishment of industrial zones, and improvement of infrastructure (Table 
3). Between 1988 and 1997, 27 new business-related laws, including the two above, were 
promulgated, and successive military governments apparently committed themselves to the 
global trend toward a market-oriented economy. 
 
Table 3: Major economic reforms under the military rule 
1988 * Introduction of Foreign Investment Law 
1989 * Decontrol of prices 
* Regularization of border trade 
* Introduction of State-owned Economic Enterprises Law delineating the scope of 
the state sector 
* Revocation of the 1965 law that established the socialist economic system 
1990 * Introduction of Myanmar Tourism Law 
 * Permission for 100% retention of export earnings 
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 * Introduction of Private Industrial Enterprise Law 
 * Introduction of the Central Bank of Myanmar Law 
 * Introduction of Financial Institutions of Myanmar Law 
 * Introduction of Myanmar Agricultural and Rural Development Law 
 * Introduction of Commercial Tax Law 
1991 * Initiation of industrial zones in Yangon 
* Announcement of the Central Bank of Myanmar Rules and Regulations 
 * Introduction of Promotion of Cottage Industries Law 
* Reestablishment of the Union of Myanmar Federation of Chambers of Commerce 
and Industry (UMFCCI) 
1992 * Announcement to lease out inefficient state-owned factories 
 * Announcement of denationalization of nationalized sawmills 
 * Announcement of the establishment of four private banks 
 * Introduction of Tariff Law 
 * Introduction of Savings Bank Law 
1993 * Introduction of US$ denominated Foreign Exchange Certificate (FEC) 
 * Introduction of Myanmar Insurance Law 
1994 * Introduction of Myanmar Citizens Investment Law 
 * Licensing of representative offices of 11 foreign banks 
 * Introduction of Science and Technology Development Law 
1995 * Announcement of the formation of Privatization Committee 
* Announcement of permission to establish joint venture banks between local private 
banks and foreign banks (although not realized until now) 
* Opening of the licensed foreign exchange center for FEC trading in Yangon 
1996   * Permission given to local private banks to conduct foreign exchange business and 
to pay interest on foreign currency deposits 
* Establishment of the Myanmar Securities Exchange Centre Co. Ltd. (MSEC), a 
joint venture between Japan's Daiwa Research Institute and the state-owned 
Myanmar Economic Bank (MEB) 
 * Introduction of law on development of computer knowledge 
* Official rate of exchange for levying custom duties changed to K100 per 
US$ accompanied by reduction of tariffs to a fraction of previous values 
1997    * Announcement of paddy procurement through a tender bid system (but this was 
not implemented) 
1998    * Announcement of leasing of fallow and virgin land for paddy and cash-crop 
cultivation or livestock breeding by private entrepreneurs, including foreigners 
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2000    * Across-the-board increase of public sector salaries, by 5-6 times, to come in line 
with private sector wages 
2003    * Announced liberalization of rice export 
* Abolishment of distribution of rice to government-related officials 
2005    * Export permits given to private rice exporters 
* An increase of official prices of gasoline and diesel by 8-9 times 
2006    * Across-the-board increase of public sector salaries by 6-12 times 
* An increase of official prices of electricity by 10 times 
2007    * An increase of official prices of gasoline and diesel by about 2 times 
2008    * Large-scale privatization of government properties and liberalization of some 
public utilities 
2010    * Liberalization of some import restrictions and permission of imports of previously 
restricted items such as cars, motorcycles, and diesel 
 
However, Myanmar people can never be fully confident of the military government’s 
commitment to transition to a genuine market economy, which would guarantee a level 
playing field for all of the economic actors including the private sector. The trend in 
Myanmar’s policy has turned increasingly inward and against market-mechanisms, 
particularly after the Asian currency crisis in mid-1997. The State Peace and Development 
Council (SPDC), the reorganized body of the military government in 1997, has consciously 
adopted an import substitution and self-reliant, or what may even be called survival, policy by 
starting to intervene in many economic activities and strengthening state controls. The Trade 
Policy Council (knows as TC), an extra-ministerial committee, is said to be responsible for 
such policy changes. 
The Trade Policy Council was formed in July 1997, with General Maung Aye, 
Vice-Chairman of the SPDC, as Chairman, and with the Minister for National Planning and 
Economic Development as Secretary. The Trade Policy Council has laid down important 
policies concerning not only external trade but also other economic affairs. These measures 
include an export-first (import against export earnings) policy, limits on non-essential imports, 
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10% export tax, advanced purchase of beans and pulses for export, advanced purchase of 
cotton, market-price-based taxation on imported vehicles, import restrictions on motor 
vehicles, monthly grants for palm oil imports, reduced FEC limits on overseas bank transfers, 
strengthened revenue collection from MIC-approved projects, and inspection of under-priced 
import invoices. The motivation for a number of these might be the capture of foreign 
exchange earnings for the government budget. 
Foreign companies have faced a more challenging business environment under such policy 
changes, and some foreign investors requested relaxation of economic controls from the 
authorities concerned. Responses to such requests from the authorities were, however, 
generally stereotyped and lacking in commitment. For example, the Myanmar Investment 
Commission (MIC) often proclaims the FIL of 1988 as its most liberal and encouraging 
investment act, which permits 100% foreign-owned investment and provides attractive tax 
incentives. Theoretically, it is comparable to those of even advanced ASEAN members. 
However, to the extent that the existence of laws such as this were used as an excuse not to 
listen to the claims of foreign investors, so the deep-seated structural problems which were 
real impediments to the inflow of foreign direct investments were not be addressed. 
Favoritism and corruption, which is endemic and constitutes a serious problem in many 
developing economies, had been largely avoided by Myanmar. On the contrary, successive 
governments had taken pride in being clean, even since the socialist period. Nevertheless, it is 
also true that economies transitioning from being centrally-planned to market-oriented tend to 
suffer from problems of favoritism and corruption because they often lack the legal and 
institutional foundations for the functioning of a free and fair market economy. 
The military holding companies, Myanmar Economic Corporation (MEC) and the Union of 
Myanmar Economic Holdings, Ltd. (UMEHL), which are extensively engaged in the 
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manufacturing and services sectors, are exerting increasing influence over business activities. 
The SEEs Law of 1989 was amended in 1997 to make it possible to establish a 100% 
military-owned company. Military-related companies themselves are not necessarily harmful 
to economic development; however, they can become harmful if they are afforded especially 
favorable treatment by the government and thereby damage the idea of a level playing field 
for all. In addition to these military holding companies, the government has started to embrace 
so-called national entrepreneurs who, it is claimed, are given preferential treatment in doing 
business. Such arbitrary favoritism, if provided, would send a worrying signal to businesses 
that the government could change even the rules of the game. 
We should note that once a business environment is created where personal connections to 
the authorities rather than management and technical skills are the most important factors for 
business success, then it becomes difficult to provide sound economic incentives to 
entrepreneurs of ability, and hence they lose confidence in the policy environment. In such a 
situation, emerging enterprises and entrepreneurs as well as potential foreign investors may 
well divert their interests to other economies or just chase windfall profits through 
rent-seeking activities. A recent series of sales of government properties to well-connected 
businessmen has also raised concerns about rampant nepotism and corruption in the Myanmar 
economy. In order to prevent Myanmar moving headlong toward so-called crony capitalism, it 
is important for the government to establish a level playing field where all economic actors 
can compete with each other in a free and fair manner. 
 
 
2. THE IMPACT OF ECONOMIC REFORMS ON INDUSTRIAL STRUCUTRE 
What impact did economic reforms, including liberalization measures, have on industrial 
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structure and performance? Whether or not the policies of the military government have 
changed industrial structure and organizational behavior and hence improved performance is a 
key issue for future industrial development in Myanmar. Nevertheless, the impact of 
economic reforms on industrial structure and performance has been poorly documented. This 
section examines this issue. 
 
2.1 Classification of industries 
In Myanmar, the Central Statistical Organization (CSO) established the Burma Standard for 
Industrial Classification (BSIC) regarding economic activities in 1952 based on the UN’s 
International Standard for Industrial Classification (ISIC) of 1948. The BSIC also categorizes 
industrial activities into three levels, that is, Divisions (1 digit), Major Groups (2 digits) and 
Groups (3 digits). Each Division is as follows: 0 Agriculture, Forestry, Hunting and Fishery; 1 
Mining and Quarrying; 2 & 3 Manufacturing; 4 Construction; 5 Electricity, Gas, Water, and 
Sanitary Services; 6 Commerce; 7 Transport, Storage, and Communication; 8 Services; and 9 
Activities Not Adequately Described. The Ministry of Industry (1) is said to be revising the 
BSIC based on the ISIC of 1990; however, the new version of BSIC has not yet been utilized 
in government reports. 
Apart from the BSIC, the Ministry of National Planning and Economic Development 
(MNPED) has used another classification in compiling national income statistics. This 
classification has been employed by the said Ministry for compiling an annual economic 
report called Review of the Financial, Economic and Social Conditions (hereinafter the 
“Review”). Under this classification system, all economic activities are classified into 14 
sectors: Agriculture; Livestock and Fishery; Forestry; Energy; Mining; Processing and 
Manufacturing; Electric Power; Construction; Transportation; Communications; Financial 
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Institutions; Social and Administrative Services; Rentals and Other Services; and Trade.1 The 
Processing and Manufacturing sector is further subdivided in the Review into 13 commodity 
groups: Food and Beverages; Clothing and Wearing Apparel; Construction Materials; 
Personal Goods; Household Goods; Printing and Publishing; Industrial Raw Materials; 
Mineral and Petroleum Products; Agriculture Equipment; Machinery and Equipment; 
Transport Vehicles; Electrical Goods; and Miscellaneous. 
 
2.2 GDP 
Industrial structure can be defined in terms of the relative importance of individual 
industries, or groups of related industries, within an economy. One of the most frequent 
measures of an industry’s importance is based on its production (value added or net output). 
Table 4 shows the relative importance of different sectors to GDP. As mentioned above, a 
14-sector classification is employed here. In addition to the problem of industrial 
classification, there is another issue as to whether we use nominal GDP or real GDP when 
looking at industrial structural changes. Nominal GDP is measured at current prices. If all 
prices doubled without any changes in quantities, then nominal GDP would double. Yet it 
would be misleading to say that the economy’s ability to satisfy demand has doubled, because 
the quantity of goods produced has remained the same. In contrast to this, real GDP, which is 
the value of goods and services measured at constant prices of a base year, would not be 
influenced by changes in prices. Since a society’s ability to provide economic satisfaction for 
its members ultimately depends on the quantities of goods and services produced, real GDP, 
which summarizes the output of the economy measured at base-year prices, provides a better 
                                                  
1 Until the Fiscal Year (FY) 1996 Review, 13 sectors were used for GDP statistics. Since the 
FY 1997 Review, “Energy” was added to make a total of 14 sectors. However, the MNPED 
stopped issuing the Review thereafter. Myanmar’s fiscal year (FY) starts from April and ends 
in March. 
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measure of economic well-being than nominal GDP. Myanmar’s GDP is calculated in 
different base years: it was calculated from FY1985 to FY2000 at FY1985 constant prices, 
from FY2001 to FY2005 at FY2000 constant prices, and the later years at FY2005 constant 
prices. 
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Table4: GDP by industrial sectors (Unit: %; % Point)
FY1985
(nominal=real) (nominal) (real) (nominal) (real) (nominal) (real) (nominal) (real)
Goods 61.3% 66.9% 60.5% 63.8% 63.5% 5.7 -0.8 -3.1 3.0
Agriculture 39.7% 48.8% 33.6% 35.4% 35.6% 9.1 -6.2 -13.4 2.1
Livestock & Fishery 7.1% 7.9% 8.3% 7.6% 7.5% 0.8 1.2 -0.3 -0.8
Forestry 1.4% 0.6% 0.9% 0.4% 0.5% -0.8 -0.5 -0.1 -0.3
Energy - 0.2% 0.5% 0.2% 0.2% - - -0.0 -0.4
Mining 1.0% 0.4% 1.9% 0.6% 0.5% -0.6 0.9 0.2 -1.3
Processing and Manufacturing 9.9% 7.2% 10.1% 14.9% 15.0% -2.8 0.2 7.7 4.8
Electric Power 0.5% 0.1% 1.1% 1.0% 0.2% -0.4 0.6 0.8 -0.9
Construction 1.7% 1.8% 4.2% 3.8% 4.0% 0.1 2.5 2.0 -0.2
Services 14.8% 9.0% 18.6% 15.1% 14.8% -5.8 3.8 6.1 -3.8
Transportation 3.6% 5.7% 4.6% 10.8% 10.9% 2.1 1.0 5.1 6.3
Communications 0.4% 0.3% 2.1% 1.0% 1.3% -0.1 1.8 0.7 -0.8
Financial Institutions 2.4% 0.1% 2.1% 0.1% 0.1% -2.3 -0.3 -0.0 -2.0
Social & Administrative Services 4.6% 0.2% 6.0% 1.6% 0.9% -4.4 1.4 1.4 -5.1
Rentals & Other Services 3.9% 1.4% 3.8% 1.6% 1.6% -2.5 -0.1 0.2 -2.1
Trade 23.9% 24.0% 20.9% 21.1% 21.6% 0.1 -3.0 -3.0 0.7
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
?Notes? Real GDP for FY1985 and FY2000 is based on FY1985 constant prices; and one for FY2007 is on FY2005 constant prices.
(Source) MNPED, Review (various issues); and CSO, Statistical Yearbook  (various issues).
Changes in Share(FY2000?FY07)FY2007 Changes in Share(FY85?FY2000)
Gross Domestic Product
FY2000
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Our main concern here is, however, with changes in industrial structure, which presupposes 
changes in price structure as well. In this section, we will pay closer attention to the relative 
importance of different sectors in nominal GDP, which also reflects changes in price structure. 
The question of whether to use nominal GDP or real GDP to ascertain structural changes in 
an economy is particularly important in the case of Myanmar. We should note that there are 
large differences in shares between nominal GDP and real GDP in different sectors. Table 4 
shows both nominal GDP and real GDP in FY1985, FY2000 and the latest year of FY2007. In 
terms of GDP share, there are differences between the nominal and real figures. For example, 
in FY1985, the agriculture sector accounted for 39.5% of both nominal and real GDP, while in 
FY2000, it accounted for 48.8% of nominal GDP and 33.6% of real GDP. On one hand, the 
agriculture sector decreased its relative importance to real GDP by 6.2 percentage points 
between FY1985 and FY2000, on the other hand it increased its share of nominal GDP by 9.1 
percentage points during the same period. On the contrary, the processing and manufacturing 
sector increased its relative importance to real GDP by 0.2 percentage points, whereas it 
decreased its share of nominal GDP by 2.8 percentage points. According to the figures for 
nominal GDP, some “agriculturalization” occurred, rather than “industrialization” during 
FY1985 and FY2000. 
Such differences between nominal GDP and real GDP are due to the differentiated rates of 
increase by the different sectors of GDP deflator. A GDP deflator compares the current price 
of a basket of goods and services produced this year with the price of the same basket in the 
base year. In other words, the GDP deflator measures the price of the typical unit of output 
relative to its price in the base year. Figure 1 and 2 show the indices of GDP deflators in 
various sectors, where the base year of FY1985 is set at 1 for Figure 1 and that of FY2000 is 
set 1 for Figure 2. 
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Figure 1: GDP deflator by industry, FY1985-99
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Figure 2: GDP deflator by industry, FY2000-07
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It is often the case that when transitioning from a centrally-planned economy to a 
market-oriented one, price structure undergoes a big change. In Myanmar’s case, the prices of 
agricultural produce and food, which had long been controlled at lower prices throughout the 
socialist period, jumped up to market level prices on account of the liberalization measures. 
The price hikes in agricultural products such as rice and vegetables were much higher than 
those in other sectors, such as industrial goods, construction, transportation, and social and 
administrative services. The share of the agriculture sector of nominal GDP increased due to 
the effect of the relative price hikes for the period between FY1985 and FY2000, although its 
share in real GDP terms decreased during the same period. 
Bearing in mind the above discussion, we now look at Table 4 to consider the structural 
changes in the economy. Looking at the figures for nominal GDP, we see that only the 
agricultural sector has increased its share substantially, while most other sectors have reduced 
their share or are little changed. It may be said that the industrial structure in Myanmar has 
been static throughout the 1990s. 
Then, why did the agriculture sector raise its share in nominal GDP in the 1990s? Firstly, 
the production of agriculture has increased. For example, the production of paddy, the sown 
area of which occupies more than 40% of the total sown area, increased by 54% from 12,956 
thousand tons in FY1988 to 19,888 thousand tons in FY1999. The increase was remarkable 
but achievable with an annual average growth rate of about 4%. As shown by the decline in 
the share of the agricultural sector in real GDP for the period between FY1985 and FY2000, 
the increases in quantity of other sectors must had surpassed that of the agricultural sector. 
Secondly, and more importantly, price hikes of agricultural produce contributed to an 
increase in its relative importance in nominal GDP. As mentioned earlier, the prices of 
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agricultural produce increased more rapidly than industrial products and services throughout 
the 1990s. In other words, the terms of trade of agricultural produce over industrial goods 
improved just after the open-door and market-oriented policies were introduced. Hence, it 
may be said that, in the 1990s, the economic welfare of farmers in rural areas was elevated 
more than that of industrial workers in urban areas. 
This policy contrasts sharply with that of the socialist regime. During the socialist period, 
the price of agricultural produce was consistently suppressed to well below normal market 
levels, which was a de facto subsidy to urban dwellers. Moreover, external trade was 
monopolized by the state and the socialist government poured much of its earnings from the 
export of agricultural produce into import substitution industries, mainly located in urban 
areas. 
The military government suddenly abandoned such policies favorable to the urban 
population and showed more concern about the well being of farmers in rural areas. Such a 
policy change was probably driven by the political and economic crisis in 1988 and the 
people’s uprising against the then government. The military government must have 
understood the importance of improving the living standards of the rural population, which 
constitutes 75% of the national population. The agriculture/rural-favored attitude of the 
present government is also expressed in their often repeated economic slogan, “Development 
of agriculture as the base and all-round development of other sectors of the economy as well”. 
However, entering the twenty-first century we saw some “industrialization” in the 
Myanmar economy. The processing and manufacturing sector increased its share in nominal 
GDP by 7.7 percentage points for the period between FY2000 and FY2007. On the contrary, 
the share of the agriculture sector of nominal GDP decreased in spite of its increase in real 
GDP for the period between FY2000 and FY2007. This was due to the deteriorated terms of 
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trade of agricultural produce against industrial goods and services. The transitional effect 
from the planned economy to market economy on the price structure settled down by the end 
of the 1990s. 
There is certainly an impression that Myanmar’s economy has changed visibly. High-rise 
buildings are conspicuous in major cities such as Yangon and Mandalay. International hotels 
and shopping malls are no longer new to the Yangon and Mandalay dwellers. Streets are 
crowded with cars, and traffic jams have become a regular morning and evening occurrence. 
Moreover, the building of the new capital city, Naypyitaw, has brought a mini boom to the 
construction sector since the early twenty-first century. 
With a series of economic reforms and transition toward a market-oriented economy, there 
was steady economic development leading to an average annual growth rate of 7.5% for the 
period of the four-year plan (1992/93-95/96), which was reasonably high in an agrarian 
economy such as Myanmar’s. The success of the first short-term plan was due to various 
factors: private sector development following the liberalization policy; inflows of FDI 
following the open-door policy; substantial increases in agricultural produce (especially rice 
following the introduction of summer paddy); growth of exports following decontrol of the 
state monopoly of foreign trade; encouragement of tourism; and the construction mini-boom.  
During the period of the Second Short-Term Five Year Plan (1996/97 to 2000/01), the 
average annual growth rate was 8.5%, mainly due to the agricultural sector and showed the 
highest growth rate in the industry sector. In the Third Short-Term Five Year Plan (2001/02 to 
2005/06), the average annual growth rate was at its peak, at 12.8 %, which was mainly due to 
an industry and energy sector development. Such substantial growth in the official GDP is, 
however, considered dubious by many economists both inside and outside the country.2 
                                                  
2 The statistics on GDP were collected by the central government through the 64 nationwide 
prefectural offices of the Planning Department, the MNPED, and the 16 state and division 
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2.3 Labor force 
Labor force statistics are another indicator of industrial structural changes. Through what is 
generally known as Petty-Clark’s law, as economic development progresses, as measured by 
per capita income, the relative importance of the primary sector falls, in terms of both 
production and labor force, while that of the secondary sector and then the tertiary sector 
rises. 
Table 5 shows changes in labor force distribution by industry. In FY2006, the agriculture 
sector constituted more than 60% of the total labor force, followed by processing and 
manufacturing (11%) and trade (10%), while all the other sectors each constituted 5% and less 
of the total labor force. The pattern of labor force distribution clearly shows the agrarian 
nature of the Myanmar economy. It also highlights the very static situation of Myanmar’s 
industrial structure. During the period between FY1988 and FY2007, changes of less than one 
percentage point occurred in the share of any industry, except the processing and 
manufacturing sector (2.4 percentage points) and the administrative and other services sector 
(1.5 percentage points); hence, dynamic structural changes are yet to be observed. 
 
                                                                                                                                                            
offices (which are in the northern, southern and eastern parts of Shan State and 13 other 
states). Reportedly, prefectural governors (military officers at the Lieutenant Colonel level) 
and commanders in military divisions (members of the National Peace Development Council 
at the Brigadier General and Major General levels) strongly influence statistics that are sent 
to senior organizations. It has long been pointed out that GDP is often inflated to make the 
rate of economic growth appear higher than it is. It is also possible that statistics may have 
been manipulated in various ways in different areas, depending on the particular nature and 
way of thinking of prefectural governors/commanders in military divisions. If so, the accuracy 
of statistics on national income in Myanmar is rather questionable. 
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Table 5: Estimated employment by industry (Unit:%)
FY64 FY74 FY88 FY98 FY 2006
Changes in share
(FY88?FY2006)
Primary Industry 66.6 69.3 65.2 65.6 70.0 4.8
Agriculture 64.8 66.7 62.6 62.4 62.0 -0.6 
Livestock & Fishery 1.5 1.3 1.4 2.1 2.0 0.6
Forestry 0.3 1.3 1.2 1.0 1.0 -0.2 
Secondary Industry 9.0 9.3 10.9 12.4 14.0 3.1
Energy & Mining 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.8 1.0 0.5
Processing and Manufacturing 7.3 7.2 8.6 9.3 11.0 2.4
Electric Power 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 -0.1 
Construction 1.1 1.5 1.7 2.1 2.0 0.3
Tertiary Industry 15.5 16.8 19.6 20.5 22.0 2.4
Transport and Communications 3.0 3.5 3.3 2.8 3.0 -0.3 
Social Services 1.7 1.8 2.8 3.4 3.0 0.2
Administrative and Other
Services
3.4 2.6 3.5 4.8 5.0
1.5
Trade 7.4 8.9 10.0 9.6 10.0 0.0
8.9 4.6 4.3 1.4 1.0 -3.3 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
(Source) MNPED, Review (various issues); and CSO, Statistical Yearbook  (various issues).
Workers n.e.s
Total
 
 
We can calculate each sector’s relative productivity (or relative income) from Tables 4 and 
5. Relative productivity is the ratio of the labor productivity of an industry (Yi/Li, where Yi 
stands for the income of industry i and Li stands for the labor force of industry i) divided by 
the labor productivity of the whole economy (Y/L, where Y denotes national income and L 
denotes total labor force). In practice, relative productivity can be calculated as the ratio of the 
share of nominal GDP (Table 4) divided by the share of labor force (Table 5), as shown in the 
following equation: 
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(Yi/Li) / (Y/L) = (Yi/Y) / (Li/L). 
If the figure for relative productivity in an industry exceeds 1, the industry has better than 
average labor productivity. 
 
0.0 
0.2 
0.4 
0.6 
0.8 
1.0 
1.2 
1.4 
1.6 
FY1988 1998 2006
(Note) Average labor productivity equals 1.0. 
Agriculture
Primary Industry
Processing and Manufacturing
Secondary Industry
Tertiary Industry
(Source) Calculated from the figures given in Table 4 and 5.
Figure 3: Relative productivity of major industries and 
groups of related industries
 
Figure 3 shows relative productivity of major industries and groups of related industries. 
While the agriculture sector increased its relative productivity for the period between FY1988 
and FY1998, secondary industry including processing and manufacturing declined its relative 
productivity for the same period. As have discussed, this was mainly due to the improvement 
of terms of trade of agricultural produce over industrial goods. However, entering the 
twenty-first century, the trend has been reversed. The secondary sector including 
manufacturing increased its relative productivity for the period between FY1998 and FY2006. 
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3. THE IMPACT OF ECONOMIC REFORMS ON OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 
In order to ascertain industrial structural changes, it is also important to examine shifts in 
ownership patterns, especially, as in the case of Myanmar, when transitioning from a 
centrally-planned economy, where the state sector is a major player, to a market-oriented 
economy, where the private sector is expected to play a major role. In this section, we 
examine the impact of economic reforms on ownership patterns. 
 
3.1 GDP 
The economic reforms of the military government began with the open-door policy and the 
recognition of private businesses. The government announced the FIL in November 1988 and 
opened the doors to foreign investment after a 25-year hiatus. It also announced the SEEs 
Law in March 1989, in which the Law conferring powers for Establishing the Socialist 
Economic System, 1965 was repealed. In other words, the military government officially 
renounced the Burmese Way to Socialism by promulgating this law. 
The SEEs Law stipulated 12 economic enterprises that the SEEs would continue to 
monopolize.3 By stipulating the 12 enterprises exclusive to SEEs, the government conversely 
allowed the private sector to enter other fields. In other words, the industrial policy for private 
sector participation in the national economy changed from “banned in principle” to “allowed 
in principle”. Under these policies, the private sector has gained momentum. 
                                                  
3 Those are (a) extraction of teak and sale of the same in the country and abroad; (b) 
cultivation and conservation of forest plantation; (c) exploration, extraction, and sale of 
petroleum and natural gas and production of products of the same; (d) exploration and 
extraction of pearls, jade, and precious stones and export of the same; (e) breeding and 
production of fish and prawns in fisheries which have been reserved for research by the 
Government; (f) Postal and Telecommunications Service; (g) Air Transport Service and 
Railway Transport Service; (h) Banking Service and Insurance Service; (i) Broadcasting 
Service and Television Service; (j) exploration and extraction of metals and export of the same; 
(k) Electricity Generating Services other than those permitted by law to private and 
co-operative electricity generating services; (l) manufacture of products relating to security 
and defense which the Government has, from time to time, prescribed by notification. 
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Table 6: Real GDP by industry and ownership
(%. % point)
Share State Co-operative Private Share State Co-operative Private share State Cooperative Private
Changes
(FY86-FY98)
Changes
(FY98-FY07) Major Factors for Changes
? Goods 61.3 11.9 5.3 82.7 59.6 11.4 1.4 87.2 63.5 - - - 4.5 -
  1 Agriculture 40.3 0.1 6.4 93.4 34.5 0.2 1.9 97.9 35.6 0.4 2.4 97.2 4.5 -0.7 Decontrol of trade of agricultural produce
  2 Livestock & Fishery 7.3 1.3 2.6 96.2 7.2 0.3 1.1 98.6 7.5 0.1 0.7 99.2 2.5 0.5 Development of private enterprises
  3 Forestry 1.3 38.0 4.4 57.6 1.0 46.2 0.6 53.2 0.5 50.0 0.3 49.7 -4.4 -3.5 Strengthened conservation of forests
 Primary Industry 49.0 1.3 5.8 92.9 42.7 1.3 1.8 97.0 43.7 - - - 4.1 -
  4 Energy - - - - 0.2 99.9 0.1 0.0 0.2 76.3 9.3 14.4 - 14.4 Entry restrictions by SEEs Law
  5 Mining 0.9 89.8 2.2 8.0 1.6 10.8 1.0 88.2 0.5 2.9 0.2 96.9 80.2 8.7 Provision of mining concession
  6 Process & Manufacturing 9.2 41.6 4.2 54.2 9.2 28.2 0.9 70.8 15.0 9.2 0.2 90.6 16.6 19.7 Development of SMIs
  7 Electric Power 0.5 100.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 99.9 0.1 0.0 0.2 79.5 0.3 20.2 0.0 20.2 Entry restrictions by SEEs Law
  8 Construction 1.7 88.3 1.0 10.8 4.9 45.8 0.2 54.0 4.0 60.1 0.0 39.9 43.2 -14.1 Entry of SMEs and NPT construction
 Secondary Industry 12.4 54.0 3.4 42.6 16.9 36.9 0.7 62.4 19.8 - - - 19.9 -
? Services 15.5 60.6 2.5 36.9 19.3 54.5 2.6 43.0 14.8 14.8 0.1 85.0 6.1 42.1
  1 Transportation 3.6 36.0 4.9 59.1 4.3 29.8 1.0 69.2 10.9 1.5 0.1 98.4 10.1 29.3 Development of private enterprises
  2 Communications 0.5 100.0 0.0 0.0 1.9 100.0 0.0 0.0 1.3 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Entry ban by SEEs Law
  3 Financial Institutions 2.6 98.9 1.1 0.0 2.0 54.8 14.4 30.7 0.1 68.9 3.8 27.3 30.7 -3.4 Lift of entry ban by LAW
  4 Social & Admin Services 4.8 98.8 1.2 0.0 6.8 88.8 0.5 10.7 0.9 76.9 0.2 22.9 10.7 12.2 New entry to social services
  5 Rentals & Other Services 4.1 9.0 3.2 87.8 4.3 3.9 2.9 93.3 1.6 0.4 0.4 99.1 5.4 5.9 Development of private enterprises
? Trade 23.1 33.9 13.5 52.6 21.1 21.3 2.4 76.3 21.6 5.0 2.4 92.7 23.7 16.4 Development of private enterprises
 Tertiary Industry 38.7 44.6 9.1 46.3 40.4 37.2 2.5 60.3 36.5 - - - 14.0 -
Gross Domestic Product 100.0 24.6 6.8 68.6 100.0 21.8 1.9 76.3 100.0 7.8 1.5 90.7 7.7 14.4
(Source) MNPED, Review (various issues); and CSO, Statistical Yearbook  (various issues).
FY1986 FY1998 Changes in Shares of Private SectorFY2007
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Table 6 shows real GDP by industry and ownership. Thus far, figures for nominal GDP 
have mainly been used to view industrial structural changes. However, the data for GDP by 
industry and ownership are only available in real GDP terms; hence the use of real GDP 
figures in this section. 
Firstly, it is noticeable in Table 6 that the private sector accounted for about 70% of real 
GDP even in FY1986, which was in the midst of the socialist regime. This high proportion of 
real GDP accounted for by the private sector in Myanmar contrasts sharply with that of other 
transitional economies in Central and Eastern Europe, where the state played a major role in 
the economy during the socialist period. The significance of the private sector in Myanmar’s 
economy was largely due to the agriculture sector, as the biggest industry, accounting for 
about 40% of real GDP in FY1986, having long been categorized as mostly in the private 
sector in GDP statistics. 
However, it should be noted that even though the private sector contributed to more than 
90% of the agriculture sector in both FY1986 and FY1998, in reality it is substantially 
different between the two periods. Throughout the socialist period, agriculture was not 
collectivized and land holdings remained in the hands of small farmers. In this sense, it may 
not be wrong to categorize the agriculture sector as a private one. Nevertheless, farmers were 
under strict state control at that time. They could not grow what they wanted, but had to 
cultivate their lands according to government policy and planning. Nor could they sell their 
produce freely at market prices, but had to sell most of their produce to the state at lower 
prices, which were unilaterally fixed by the government. Farmers could not enjoy freedom of 
management in those days. 
In November 1987, the government decontrolled trade of the main agricultural produce, 
which had long been monopolized by the state under the socialist regime. Since then, farmers 
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have been able to sell their products at market after selling a proportion to the state. After this, 
farmers have become more responsive to market forces, reacting positively to the price 
incentives. Farmers now enjoy a relatively larger freedom of management compared to the 
socialist era. In this way, even though the agricultural sector has always been categorized as 
“the private sector”, the real situation is totally different before and after 1988. 
Secondly, in contrast to the agriculture sector, some of the other sectors were largely 
occupied by SEEs, even in FY2007. Energy, Electric Power, Communications, and Social and 
Administration Services were mostly monopolized by the state. The state also controlled 
substantial shares of Forestry, Construction, and Financial Institutions. Many of the said 
industries that were monopolized or dominated by the state are on the list of 12 industries 
exclusively for the SEEs. But an exception clause (Section 4 of the SEEs Law) exists whereby, 
with a view to the interest of the state, private business enterprises may be allowed to enter 
the 12 industries in the form of joint-ventures with SEEs or even in the form of pure private 
ownership. Accordingly, many private companies, including foreign ones, have invested in 
some of 12 enterprises. Large-scale foreign investments in Yadana and Yetagon natural gas 
exploration are good examples. On the other hand, although the entry ban to industries such 
as Forestry, Construction, and Financial Institutions was lifted, still large-scale SEEs persist, 
giving the state a considerable share of those industries. 
Thirdly, in spite of the remaining entry barriers, and other restrictions, the private sector 
positively reacted to industrial liberalization. The participation of the private sector increased 
particularly in Mining, Process and Manufacturing, Construction, Transportation and 
Financial Institutions, in fact, the share of the private sector increased in all industries except 
Forestry from FY1986 to FY2007. The government provided mining concessions to private 
enterprises in order to enhance production and thereby obtain revenue. The share of the 
27 
 
private sector in Mining rose from 8.0% in FY1986 to 96.9% in FY2007. As for Construction, 
private construction companies mushroomed along with the construction mini-boom which 
started in the early 1990s but had burst by mid-1997. Regarding the Financial Institutions 
sector, although it was one of the 12 enterprises exclusively for SEEs, the establishment of 
private financial institutions was allowed by the Financial Institutions of Myanmar Law, 
enacted in July 1990. Under to this Law, 20 private banks were established since 1992, but 
only 14 now remain.4 The share of GDP of private sector financial institutions increased 
rapidly from zero in 1991 to 42% in FY2002 before the domestic banking crisis, after which it 
decreased to 27% in FY2007. The share of the private sector in the Processing and 
Manufacturing sector has also substantially and steadily increased since FY1986, and reached 
to more than 90% in FY2007, mainly due to the emerging small and medium-sized industries 
(SMIs). The same case is applicable to the Trade sector. 
All these figures point to the active participation of the private sector in the national 
economy. As entry barriers and restrictions imposed upon private businesses are lifted, the 
participation of the private sector in economic activities is further enhanced, even in the 
industries that are still monopolized or controlled by the predominant SEEs. Myanmar’s 
private sector is active and efficient enough to respond to government liberalization policies. 
Myanmar’s private sector has demonstrated its resilience by surviving the socialist period and 
its ability to participate in the national economy once the market economy was revived. Given 
equal chances, the private sector will actively penetrate most economic sectors and contribute 
to economic development; this is an important finding in this section. 
 
3.2 Business registration 
                                                  
4 However, foreign banks are not yet permitted to operate. 
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As the private sector takes an increasing role in the national economy, business entities 
registered with the authorities concerned have mushroomed. Table 7 shows the number of 
various kinds of businesses, the data for which was collected from several sources such as the 
Directorate of Hotels and Tourism, the Directorate of Investment and Company 
Administration, and the Directorate of Trade. 
Almost certainly there is some overlapping and double counting in the table. For example, 
Myanmar Companies Limited can be organized according to the Burma Companies Act 
(1913) and Partnership Firms can be established according to the Partnership Act (1932). 
When these companies or partnerships engage in external trade, they must obtain export and 
import licenses from the Ministry of Commerce and are thus counted as Exporters and as 
Importers too. In the same way, hoteliers have to obtain a business license from the Ministry 
of Hotels and Tourism and are therefore counted as a Hotel Business in Table 7. If a hotel also 
runs a tourist business, it may be registered as a Tourist Enterprise as well. Tourist Enterprises 
and Tourist Transport Businesses may also overlap. Moreover, some entities may be just paper 
companies not engaged in any actual business. For these reasons, we must remain aware that 
the data in Table 7 may contain overlapping, double counted, and empty figures. 
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Table 7: Number of registered exporters, importers, limited companies, partnerships and joint-venture companies limited
FY1989 FY1997 FY2000 FY2001 FY2002 FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006 FY2007 FY2008
1 Exporters 770 8931 15142 1350 1231 777 920 1089 1591 1054 1221
2 Importers 216
3 Business Representatives 183 2076 2230 74 48 44 41 27 19 19 13
4 Myanmar Companies Limited 174 10844 15418 9596 10444 11266 12512 14376 14234 14876 16656
5 Partnership Firms 376 1214 1264 1264 1269 1269 1270 1270 1270 1270 1072
6 Foreign Companies and Branches 39 1184 1414 1410 1446 1456 1466 1477 1489 1494 1258
7 Joint Venture Companies Ltd.* 15 123 60 64 66 66 66 66 66 66 67
(a) SEE and Private Entrepreneurs 7 31 45 50 52 52 52 52 52 52 52
(b) SEE and Foreign Companies 8 92 15 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 15
8 JV Companies Ltd. formed
under Foreign Investment Law
- 78 116 77 77 79 80 81 81 82 117
9 Other Organizations 3 35 39 39 40 40 41 41 41 41 41
10 Tourist Enterprises - 474 601 601 568 536 594 700 678 697 767
11 Tourist Transport Business - 1642 423 423 357 397 352 378 442 465 310
12 Hotel Business - 302 343 336 353 375 405 427 438 462 476
13 Lodging-House Business - 198 178 178 174 161 165 168 168 156 148
14 Tour Guide Business - 2767 5034 5019 5442 6028 6069 6327 4157 4278 4701
Total 1776 29868 42262 20431 21515 22494 23981 26427 24674 24960 26847
(Note) *Excluding those under Foreign Investment Law. Exporters include Importers since FY1992.
(Source) MNPED, Review (various issues); and CSO, Statistical Yearbook  (various issues).
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Bearing such shortcomings in mind, it can be seen from Table 7 that, firstly, there is a 
significant increase in the number of various business entities registered, increasing by 15 
times from the total of 1,776 as of FY1989 to 26,847 as of FY2008. Of course, not all of them 
would be truly new entries, some having already existed and just registered with the 
authorities concerned according to newly promulgated laws. Nevertheless, it can be safely 
said that the private sector responded positively to the market-oriented policy and started up 
businesses. 
Secondly, although the number of various business entities shows strong growth until the 
end of the 1990s, since then the growth rate has slowed and declined further due to the 
economic downturn. FY2001 saw a major decline in the numbers of Exporters/Importers and 
Myanmar Companies Limited, probably due to the changes of the government policy. 
Thirdly, the so-called formalization of business entities is observed. The share of Exporters 
and Importers, which are generally regarded as simple business entities, substantially declined 
from 55% in FY 1989 to 4.5% in FY 2008. Similarly, the share of Partnership Firms, which 
are also regarded as simple business entities, declined from 21% to 4% in the same period. 
Contrary to these, Myanmar Companies Ltd., that is, formal business entities, increased its 
share from 10% in FY 1989 to 62  in FY 2008. This is what may be termed the formalization 
of business entities. 
Lastly, tourism-related businesses recorded a high growth rate. The aggregated share of 
tourism-related businesses, covering 10 to 14 in Table 7, increased from 3% in FY 1992 to 
24% in FY 2008. However, the increased number of registered tourism-related businesses 
does not necessarily indicate the prosperity of tourism in Myanmar. For example, there are 
many tour guides who registered themselves with the authorities concerned but could not find 
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a job in the tourism sector due to stagnant tourism in Myanmar. The number of overseas 
visitors jumped from 170,143 in FY1995 to 310,298 in FY1996 due to the Visit Myanmar 
Year campaign, and recorded 345,829 in FY1998. However, visitor numbers suffered a 
downturn, falling to 309,418 in FY1999. Tourist arrivals reached a peak of 448,135 in 
FY2006, then showed a decline in FY2007 to 363,976. The number of tourism-related 
businesses has declined since 2007 after demonstrations by monks in some major cities. 
 
 
4. PRIVATE MANUFACTURING FIRMS 
In the previous sections, we reviewed the changes in industrial structure from the aspects of 
GDP, labor force, and business registration. A drastic industrial change, namely, 
industrialization, was not observed during the 1990s and the first decade of the twenty-first 
century. 
However, when visiting some of the newly established industrial zones in Yangon, one is 
able to get a real sense of the vitality that exists in the nation's manufacturing industry, which 
goes beyond the impressions given by the above-mentioned macro-economic indices. This 
vitality is supported by manufacturing industries in the private sector. In FY1986, the private 
sector accounted for 54.2% in the processing and manufacturing sector, yet by FY2007 this 
share recorded more than 90%. The industrial development in Myanmar can be solely 
attributed to the growth of private enterprises. 
 
4.1 Statistics regarding the manufacturing industry 
Statistics related to the manufacturing industry are available from three major sources: a. 
statistics regarding plants and establishments contained in the Review, b. statistics regarding 
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private plants and establishments that have registered with the Directorate of Industrial 
Supervision and Inspection (DISI), Ministry of Industry (1), and c. statistics on 18 industrial 
zones which fall under the umbrella of the Myanmar Industrial Development Committee 
(MIDC). 
The first source covers private, cooperative, and state-owned enterprises. The second 
source covers only private factories and establishments that registered with the DISI, and 
basically excludes very small businesses such as cottage industries. The Private Industrial 
Enterprise Law (November 1990) stipulates that enterprises using power equipment of 3HP or 
over or which have 10 or more employees (except companies involved in joint ventures with 
state-owned enterprises) must register with the DISI. Private enterprises with power 
equipment of less than 3HP or which have fewer than 10 employees and those in the manual 
industry (irrespective of the number of employees) can register with the Department of 
Household Industry, Ministry of Cooperatives, based on the Promotion of Cottage Industries 
Law (October 1991), although this registration is neither compulsory nor obligatory.5 The 
relationship between the two kinds of statistics can be seen from Table 8. When the figures of 
various sectors are compared, large gaps are seen to exist between them. The differences 
between those are quite anomalous, and the DISI figures are usually much smaller than the 
Review. Reportedly, there exist quite a few factories that are not yet registered with the DISI. 
This means the DISI statistics involve only a portion of the currently existing plants and 
establishments in the country. Such incompleteness and inconsistency regarding the statistics 
leads to an ambiguous picture of the actual situation regarding the nation's private 
manufacturing industry. 
                                                  
5 The third source covers only private factories and establishments in 18 industrial zones. 
However, the author was not able to obtain the data. In this section, we use only the first and 
second sources. 
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Table 8: Private factories and establishments from two sources
Review DISI Review DISI Review DISI Review DISI
Food and beverages 35,043 26,896 35,559 27,337 30,953 27,601 32,507 28,137
Clothing and wearing apparel 4,994 2,282 4,752 2,053 5,617 1,962 6,021 1,895
Construction materials 4,849 3,551 4,793 3,494 3,915 3,320 4,029 3,240
Consumers goods 2,434 1,071 2,405 1,023 3,330 1,015 3,753 1,054
Household goods 605 265 652 309 468 318 458 305
Printing and publishing 457 329 6,603 410 7,482 356 8,041 291
Industrial raw material 2,252 1,183 2,063 991 2,240 1,011 2,485 947
Metal and petroleum products 3,043 1,832 2,885 1,668 3,230 1,786 3,128 1,665
Agricultural equipments 1,447 61 152 63 248 74 257 79
Machinery and equipments 504 338 447 280 848 254 902 300
Transportation vehicles 425 138 429 141 1,195 156 1,280 238
Electrical products 480 59 489 63 777 58 782 60
Miscellaneous 18,530 5,430 18,397 5,492 41,621 5,510 44,564 5,552
Total 75,063 43,435 79,626 43,324 101,924 43,421 108,207 43,763
(Source) MNPED, Review (various issues); and DISI.
FY 2004 FY 2005 FY 2006 FY 2007
 
4.2 Growth of private manufacturing 
Table 9 shows the ownership pattern of factories and establishment by size, measured in 
terms of number of employees. Most of the manufacturing enterprises in Myanmar are 
micro-sized establishments with fewer than 10 workers, which account for 96% of the total in 
FY2007. Among them, 99.9% are owned by private entrepreneurs. On the other hand, state 
economic enterprises constitute 47% of large-scale factories, which accounts, however, for 
only 1% of total establishments. Thus, the ownership structure of the manufacturing sector in 
Myanmar is characterized as one with a small number of large-scale state-owned economic 
enterprises and a large number of micro and small private establishments. 
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Table 9: Factories and establishments by number of workers as of FY2007
Micro (Below 10) 110 0.1% 13 0.0% 104748 99.9% 104871 96%
Small (10- 50) 232 8% 60 2% 2595 90% 2887 3%
Medium (51-100) 173 24% 14 2% 546 74% 733 1%
Large (Over 100) 281 47% 5 1% 318 53% 604 1%
Total 796 1% 92 0% 108207 99% 109095 100%
(Source) MNPED, Review (various issues); and CSO, Statistical Yearbook (various issues). 
The ratio of column of Total is one as of total number of factories and establishments.
Number of Workers State Co-operative Private Total
(Note) The ratios of columns of State, Co-operative and Private are ones as of each row's number of factories and
establishments.
 
 
Tables 10 and 11 show the development of private industries that registered with the DISI.6 
According to the Private Industrial Enterprise Law enacted in November 1990, any private 
industrial enterprise using 3HP and with 10 or more wage-earning workers shall register 
themselves with the DISI. Then Procedures relating to the Private Industrial Enterprise Law 
were issued on February 1, 1991. In the Procedures, the authorities concerned requested that 
existing private industrial enterprises apply for registration within 120 days from February 1, 
1991. If they applied for registration within 120 days, then they would be allowed to continue 
their production activities before receiving any directive from the Directorate. The number of 
registrations jumped from 27 in FY1990 to 23,848 in FY1991. However, the growth of 
registered number stabilized in the following fiscal year: it increased by only 5.2%, recording 
25,081 in FY1992. It can be said that almost all private enterprises that should be registered 
according to the Law and Procedures and had intentions to do so had actually registered by 
the end of FY1991. Thus, increases in the figures of registered industries after FY1992 can 
generally be regarded as new entrants. 
 
                                                  
6 Industries are classified using the two-digit classifying method of ISIC. The Ministry of 
Industry (1) has revised the Myanmar standard industry classification (BSIC, 1952 version) 
based on the 1990 version of the International Standard Industry Classification (ISIC). 
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Table 10: Registered private industries by product group, 1992-1999
Product group No.of estbts Employment
Av.no.of
employment
Share in
no.of estbts
Share in
employment
No.of estbts Employment
Av.no.of
employment
Share in
no.of estbts
Share in
employment
No.of estbts Employment
Av.no.of
employment
Share in
no.of estbts
Share in
employment
Food products 13,406 60,537 4.5 56% 54% 22,106 92,922 4.2 63% 54% 22,152 93,957 4.2 62% 51%
Tobacco products 130 868 6.7 1% 1% 149 1,726 11.6 0% 1% 146 1,913 13.1 0% 1%
Textiles 1,520 10,543 6.9 6% 9% 2,348 17,334 7.4 7% 10% 2,093 18,158 8.7 6% 10%
Wearing apparel 17 230 13.5 0.1% 0% 69 8,870 128.6 0% 5% 160 12,863 80.4 0% 7%
Leather and its products 133 645 4.8 1% 1% 231 1,232 5.3 1% 1% 289 3,038 10.5 1% 2%
Wood, wood products 2,571 13,797 5.4 11% 12% 2,647 16,011 6.0 8% 9% 2,756 17,243 6.3 8% 9%
Paper and its products 231 973 4.2 1% 1% 250 1,133 4.5 1% 1% 267 1,299 4.9 1% 1%
Publishing and printing 251 1,048 4.2 1% 1% 280 1,223 4.4 1% 1% 285 1,268 4.4 1% 1%
Coke and petrol products 1 3 3.0 0% 0% 5 40 8.0 0% 0% 5 29 5.8 0% 0%
Chemicals and its products 399 1,841 4.6 2% 2% 392 1,874 4.8 1% 1% 411 2,157 5.2 1% 1%
Rubber and Plastics 637 2,969 4.7 3% 3% 722 3,951 5.5 2% 2% 733 4,493 6.1 2% 2%
Other non-metallic mineral
products 226 1,081 4.8 1% 1% 270 1,867 6.9 1% 1% 282 2,104 7.5 1% 1%
Basic metals 539 2,837 5.3 2% 3% 581 3,356 5.8 2% 2% 607 3,691 6.1 2% 2%
Metal products 661 3,179 4.8 3% 3% 1,101 5,380 4.9 3% 3% 1,206 6,069 5.0 3% 3%
Machinery and equipment 102 424 4.2 0% 0% 353 1,580 4.5 1% 1% 586 3,408 5.8 2% 2%
Electrical, machinery and
apparatus
293 777 2.7 1% 1% 272 911 3.3 1% 1% 255 900 3.5 1% 0%
Radio,TV, others 2 6 3.0 0% 0% 4 17 4.3 0% 0% 8 22 2.8 0% 0%
Medical and optical instrumen 4 23 5.8 0% 0% 5 27 5.4 0% 0% 7 36 5.1 0% 0%
Motor vehicles and trailers 2,622 8,751 3.3 11% 8% 2,871 10,356 3.6 8% 6% 2,802 10,275 3.7 8% 6%
Other transport equipment 71 300 4.2 0% 0% 103 507 4.9 0% 0% 119 500 4.2 0% 0%
Furniture 301 1,396 4.6 1% 1% 432 2,105 4.9 1% 1% 428 2,453 5.7 1% 1%
Total 24,117 112,228 4.7 100% 100% 35,191 172,422 4.9 100% 100% 35,597 185,876 5.2 100% 100%
(Note) Av.No.of Employment stands for Average Number of Employment.
         Figures for 1999 is as of end of September 1999.
?Source?DISI, Ministry of Industry (1).
1992 1996 1999
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Table 11: Registered private industries by product group, 2000-2008
Product group 2000 2005 2006 2007 2008
Food 23,478       23,689     23,885     26,161     26,896     27,337     27,601     28,137     28,728     
Clothing 1,826        1,830       1,589       2,378       2,282       2,053       1,962       1,895       1,802       
Shelter 3,086        3,193       3,295       3,507       3,551       3,494       3,320       3,240       3,111       
Consumers goods 1,123        1,112       1,126       1,129       1,071       1,023       1,015       1,054       1,003       
Household goods 282           290          215          196          265          309          318          305          307          
Printing and publishing 341           345          355          340          329          410          356          291          283          
Raw material 1,403        1,380       1,322       1,259       1,183       991          1,011       947          899          
Metal and oil products 1,624        1,610       1,759       1,787       1,832       1,668       1,786       1,665       1,665       
Agricultural equipments 47             48           48           52           61           63           74           79           77           
Machinery and equipments 625           685          680          718          338          280          254          300          278          
Transportation 86             86           83           79           138          141          156          238          233          
Electrical products 40             48           47           54           59           63           58           60           64           
General machinery 3,638        3,938       4,107       4,769       5,430       5,492       5,510       5,552       5,337       
Total 37,599       38,254     38,511     42,429     43,435     43,324     43,421     43,763     43,787     
?Source?DISI, Ministry of Industry (1).
2001 2002 2003 2004
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The number of registered private industries increased from 24,117 factories in 1992 to 
35,597 in 1999, with an average annual growth rate of 5.7%. The growth of Garment 
(Wearing Apparel) was the highest, with a growth rate of 37.8% per annum, which was 
followed by Machinery and Equipment with 28.4%, Coke and Petrol Products with 25.8%, 
and Radio, TV, Communication Equipment Manufacturing with 21.9%. 
As registered industries increased, so too did their employment. Once again the Garment 
Industry recorded the highest growth rate, of 77.7% per annum. This was followed by Coke 
and Petrol Products with 38.3%, Machinery and Equipment with 34.7%, Leather and Leather 
Products with 24.8%, and Radio, TV, Communication Equipment Manufacturing with 20.4%. 
The average number of workers at Garment Industry establishments exceeded 80 workers 
per factory, whereas that of all manufacturing industries was just 5.2. As a result, the share of 
total employment by the Garment Industry increased from a negligible percentage in 1992 to 
7% in 1999. Both domestic and foreign companies vigorously invested in Garment Industry 
and the number of garment factories is estimated to have reached more than 300 at its peak 
around 2000, making it surely one of the most vibrant industries in Myanmar.7 
Apart from the garment industry, however, the industrial structure shown in Table 10 has 
not been much changed. Myanmar’s industry is still characterized by the extremely large 
share of agro-based consumer goods industries with less importance on heavy industries.8 
The upgrading and diversification of the industrial sector in Myanmar has yet to be observed. 
Starting from 2000, the groups of registered private industries have changed from 21 
product groups to 13 business types. The new industrial grouping is shown in Table 11. By 
comparing the figures for 2000 and 2008, in terms of percentage share, the food industry 
                                                  
7 See Kudo [2010 forthcoming] for the growth and decline of garment industry in Myanmar in 
the 1990s and early 2000s. 
8 Although Motor Vehicles and Trailers occupy 8% of total establishments, most of them are 
considered to be small and medium-size repair workshops. 
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sector grew by 4% points, clothing and garment decreased by 1% point, general machineries 
grew by 2% points, and other industries remained the same. 
 
 
5. GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF INDUSTRIES 
5.1 Geographical distribution 
We next review the spatial distribution of plants and establishments. The sovereign territory 
of Myanmar is 1.8 times greater than that in Japan, and the country has diverse geographical 
and climatic aspects, with levels of industrial concentration that vary from district to district. 
Tables 12 show the number of privately owned plants in different divisions and states. In 
terms of the number of establishments, the greatest industrial concentration in 2000 was in the 
Mandalay Division (21%), followed by Yangon (14%), Bago (13%), Ayeyarwady (13%), and 
Sagaing (11%).9 The spatial distribution has not changed for the period between 2000 and 
2009. 
 
                                                  
9 Yangon is the largest in terms of number of employees, production amount, and amount of 
investment, reflecting its size. 
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Table12: Registered private industries by state and division
as of 2009
Mandalay Division 7,651     21.6% 7,655     21.2% 17.7% 6,574             13.4% 11.6              0.02% 8.1%
Yangon Division 5,466     15.5% 5,117     14.2% 14.0% 5,560             11.3% 9.2               -2.2% 10.7%
Bago Division 4,358     12.3% 4,784     13.2% 10.9% 5,099             10.4% 9.4               3.2% 13.5/15.0*
Ayeyarwaddy Division 3,875     11.0% 4,690     13.0% 14.9% 6,779             13.8% 6.9               6.6% 8.7%
Sagaing Division 4,094     11.6% 3,986     11.0% 10.8% 5,488             11.2% 7.3               -0.9% 17.4%
Shan State 1,943     5.5% 2,447     6.8% 8.6% 4,851             9.9% 5.0               8.0% 6.5/11.2/8.3**
Magway Division 2,228     6.3% 2,020     5.6% 5.1% 4,548             9.3% 4.4               -3.2% 10.4%
Mon State 1,934     5.5% 1,778     4.9% 5.6% 2,502             5.1% 7.1               -2.8% 9.7%
Tanithayi Division 1,121     3.2% 923        2.6% 2.0% 1,356             2.8% 6.8               -6.3% 8.2%
Rakhine State 845        2.4% 909        2.5% 4.9% 2,744             5.6% 3.3               2.5% 8.2%
Kachin State 837        2.4% 781        2.2% 2.3% 1,272             2.6% 6.1               -2.3% 23.9%
Kayin State 363        1.0% 423        1.2% 1.2% 1,489             3.0% 2.8               5.2% 8.0%
Chin State 380        1.1% 401        1.1% 1.2% 480                1.0% 8.4               1.8% 13.7%
Kayah State 253        0.7% 238        0.7% 0.8% 266                0.5% 8.9               -2.0% 15.8%
Total 35,348   100.0% 36,152   100% 100% 49,008           100.0% 7.4               0.8% 10.5%
?Notes?* 13.5% for Bago Central; 15.0% for Bago West, ** 6.5% for Shan East; 11.2% for Shan South; 8.3% for Shan North.
?Source?DISI, Ministry of Industry (1).
Population %
Establishments/
100person in
2000
Growth of no of
estab (1997-
2000)
GDP Growth
in FY99March 1997 March 2000
No of establishment
State / Division
Population in
2000
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Approximately 70% of privately owned plants are located in these five major divisions. 
The five major divisions together account for 82% of the total number of employees, 84% of 
production output, and 89% of total investment. With regard to industrial concentration 
density, the three largest divisions, namely, Mandalay, Yangon, and Bago, have more than 
nine plants per 100 people and constitute industrial areas of comparatively high concentration 
density within the country. From the above, it can be said that Yangon and Bago in the 
metropolitan zone and the suburbs of Mandalay, the second largest city, constitute two of the 
largest industrial concentration areas. 
In contrast, the number of plants per 100 people is small in Magway Division, Rakhine 
State, and Kayin State, which shows that industrial concentration has not progressed in these 
areas. Surprisingly, the industrial concentration density is comparatively high in the Chin and 
Kayah regions, which are located in mountainous areas like Rakhine and Kayin. This may be 
the result of erroneous statistical collection techniques, and therefore poses a problem when 
using this information together with other social and economic indices. 
The change in the number of plants from 1997 to 2000 also indicates different features by 
divisions and states. As previously mentioned, in FY1991, the Private Industrial Enterprise 
Law and relevant regulations on application procedures were enacted to initiate a registration 
system for privately owned plants. Thereafter, the rate of new registrations continued to 
markedly increase until FY1996, after which it slowed due to economic stagnation. Tables 12 
shows that the number of privately owned plants registered per year increased 0.8% on an 
annual basis between the two periods. This is in sharp contrast to the nation's GDP which, 
according to the Myanmar government, continued to experience a rapid growth rate of 5.7%, 
5.8%, and 10.9% for FY1997, FY1998, and FY1999, respectively. Furthermore, the 
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processing and manufacturing industries attained even higher levels of growth, of 5.0%, 6.2%, 
and 15.6% for the same years. In order to boost value-added production without increasing 
the number of plants, it is necessary to increase per plant production capacity or the overall 
value of products. A major increase in per plant production capacity is not readily conceivable, 
since the distribution of plant size remains unchanged, with small-sized plants continuing to 
be dominant in the private sector. The value of products will not easily be increased either, 
since there have been no significant changes in the distribution of business categories. 
Although the possibility remains for increased production by state-owned plants, the ratio of 
processing and manufacturing industries in the state-owned sector has been on the decline as 
discussed in this paper. Therefore, the effects of large-scale production increases by 
state-owned plants, if any, will be limited. For these reasons, high growth rates in GDP were 
not conceivable in FY1987 and thereafter, as far as the changes in the number of plants. 
Different trends are observable in the changes between 1997 and 2000 by different regions. 
The number of plants increased 5-8% on average in Ayeyarwaddy Division, Shan State, and 
Khine State, and decreased 3-6% in Taninthayi Division, Magway Division, and Mon State, 
presumably reflecting different economic trends in the respective areas. Figures on the growth 
rate of GDP by division and state are available only for FY 1999. As far as these figures are 
concerned, however, there are no correlations between changes in the number of plants and 
economic trends. Since there are no statistics to indicate the changes in the distribution of 
business categories in different areas either, it remains unclear which business categories have 
increased or decreased. 
 
5.2 Features of some industrial clusters 
Table 13 summarizes the number of plants as of April 1997 in different divisions, states, 
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and business categories. Figure 4 shows the number of plants in major business categories in 
the five major industry concentration areas, which were selected from Table 12. As already 
pointed out, about 70% of the privately owned plants registered at the DISI were concentrated 
in these five major areas, and the five business categories shown in Figure 4 accounted for 
88% of the total. 
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Table 13: Registered private oidustries by state and diision and by sector,  as of 1997
ISIC1 Kachin Kayah Kayin Chin Sagaing Thaninthayi Bago Magway Mandalay Mon Rakhine Yangon Shan Ayeyarwaddy Total %
Food products 15 569 113 240 375 3113 776 3409 1522 3055 1208 641 2504 1414 3269 22208 62.8%
Tobacco products 16 1 - 1 - 15 - 27 27 41 6 - 7 8 12 145 0.4%
Textiles 17 5 - - - 344 - 86 282 1503 5 - 108 4 15 2352 6.7%
Wearing apparel 18 - - - - 3 - 2 - 2 - - 64 - - 71 0.2%
Leather and its products 19 - 2 - - 15 - 3 2 175 - 2 33 2 1 235 0.7%
Wood, wood products2) 20 188 90 46 - 220 63 409 113 572 164 75 449 129 151 2669 7.6%
Paper and its products 21 - 1 1 - 3 - 9 5 56 7 - 140 26 3 251 0.7%
Publishing and printing 22 1 2 - - 4 7 18 1 61 6 6 150 16 4 276 0.8%
Coke and petrol products 23 - - - - - - - - 2 - - - 1 - 3 0.0%
Chemicals and its products 24 - - 4 - 8 - 26 28 122 22 3 142 20 15 390 1.1%
Rubber and Plastics 25 - - 2 - 6 3 5 3 64 87 1 510 13 3 697 2.0%
Other non-metallic mineral products 26 2 8 2 1 43 3 21 8 79 13 - 66 7 25 278 0.8%
Basic metals 27 2 - 3 - 40 6 23 15 211 9 1 264 4 11 589 1.7%
Metal products 28 18 5 17 - 39 30 53 26 468 33 5 330 55 41 1120 3.2%
Machinery and equipment 29 - - 2 - 19 - 15 14 197 6 2 89 13 28 385 1.1%
Electrical, machinery and apparatus 31 5 3 9 - 33 9 1 1 41 77 2 45 30 13 269 0.8%
Radio,TV, others 32 - - - - - - - - 1 - - 3 1 - 5 0.0%
Medical and optical instruments 33 - - - - - - - 1 - - - 3 1 - 5 0.0%
Motor vehicles and trailers 34 41 26 6 4 184 176 200 176 945 154 100 434 180 235 2861 8.1%
Other transport equipment 35 - 2 - - - 3 13 2 15 17 4 34 4 6 100 0.3%
Furniture 36 5 1 30 - 5 45 38 2 41 120 3 91 15 43 439 1.2%
Total 837 253 363 380 4094 1121 4358 2228 7651 1934 845 5466 1943 3875 35348 100%
2.4% 0.7% 1.0% 1.1% 11.6% 3.2% 12.3% 6.3% 21.6% 5.5% 2.4% 15.5% 5.5% 11.0% 100.0%
(Notes) 1) International standard for industrial classification. 2) excluding furniture.
?Source?DISI, Ministry of Industry (1).
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Table 13 and Figure 4 show the features of the distribution of business categories in major 
five areas. From these it can be ascertained that, firstly, the food manufacturing industry 
constitutes the largest share for all divisions and states. The industry accounts for 63% of all 
industries in Myanmar in terms of number of enterprises (and about 75% in areas other than 
Yangon and Mandalay). The five business categories shown in Figure 4 account for about 
90% of the total number of enterprises, which indicates that manufacturing in Myanmar is 
still centered on the simple processing of agricultural products, with business categories being 
non-diversified and processing technologies remaining at low levels. 
Secondly, the textile, wood processing, metal processing, and machine manufacturing 
industries make up a large percentage of the industries in the Yangon and Mandalay Divisions, 
suggesting that there is some level of diversification here. The food manufacturing industry 
accounts for 46% and 40% of all industries in these two divisions, respectively. 
Thirdly, the concentration of textile, metal, automobile, and trailer manufacturing industries 
(centering on automobile parts, metal and machine processing, and repair workshops) in 
Mandalay is noteworthy. More than 60% of textile manufacturers in the country are located in 
Mandalay Division, and when those in the adjacent Magway Division are included, nearly 
80% of the nation's textile manufacturers are seen to be concentrated in the central part of 
Myanmar. Most of these establishments appear to be those making "longyi" (sarongs) and 
cotton blankets, as well as other textile manufacturers. 
Industries that repair automobiles and manufacture automobile spare parts and machine 
parts, are concentrated in the Mandalay industrial park, where about 150 small automobile 
repair workshops are located. Reportedly, nearly 70% of the medium- and large-size trucks 
and buses that connect Yangon and Mandalay are serviced and repaired in this industrial park. 
Due to strict import regulations, automobiles in Myanmar are mostly secondhand models that 
46 
 
were made 10 or so years ago, which generate great demand for spare parts and repair 
services. As a result of its skills in imitating other's technologies, and its many shops which 
repair antiquated vehicles, Mandalay is now the largest base for automobile-related businesses. 
In addition to automobile-related workshops, there are a number of plants where electric 
appliances, agricultural machines and equipment, and other types of machinery are actively 
being manufactured, making this area the country's largest concentration of machine 
manufacturing. 
Fourthly, in Yangon there are a considerable number of plants other than those related to the 
five major business categories. About 40% of those classified as "others" in Figure 4 are 
concentrated in this area. They include business categories such as rubber and plastic products, 
base metal products, publishing and printing, chemical products, and paper manufacturing. In 
this sense, it can be said that the industrial concentration in Yangon is the most diversified in 
the country. 
 
5.3 Features of size distribution in different areas 
Using Table 14, we see the features of size distribution in different areas and at nationwide 
level. Here again, differences are observed in the various divisions and states. Regarding all 
industries in Myanmar, it has generally been said that small-scale plants are dominant 
(accounting for 80% of the total number of plants), while large-scale enterprises play a lesser 
role (accounting for only 5%). However, in terms of production output and amount of 
investment, large-scale plants account for 37% and 40%, respectively. Given the 
corresponding figures for small-scale plants, 36% and 37%, respectively, large-scale plants 
can be said to have a marginally larger shares compared to small-scale plants. Despite 
large-scale plants having fewer employees (24% of the total, which is less than half that of 
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small-scale plants 57%), the fact that they are playing a vital role in comparatively 
capital-intensive business categories cannot be overlooked. 
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Table14: Registered private industries by size and by states and divisions, as of March 2000
Large Medium Small Total Large Medium Small Total Large Medium Small Total Large Medium Small Total Large Medium Small Total
Mandalay Division 378         1,191       6,086       7,655       5,360       8,063       25,317     38,740     1,232       1,155       2,069       4,457       27,363     32,728     73,153     133,244   839         846         1,400       3,085       
Yangon Division 678         996         3,443       5,117       26,028     9,282       14,081     49,391     5,912       1,733       2,307       9,952       67,867     26,224     38,630     132,721   2,685       946         654         4,285       
Bago Division 228         447         4,109       4,784       6,014       4,733       14,422     25,169     1,947       1,055       1,397       4,399       22,485     15,935     53,663     92,083     536         250         575         1,361       
Ayeyarwaddy Division 161         599         3,930       4,690       3,524       6,642       16,230     26,396     1,208       2,767       2,319       6,294       11,740     23,181     53,565     88,486     114         162         472         748         
Sagaing Division 115         327         3,544       3,986       1,657       2,736       11,730     16,123     1,051       883         992         2,926       6,973       11,088     40,826     58,887     105         173         496         774         
Magway Division 18           142         1,860       2,020       178         1,065       5,914       7,157       41           239         670         949         1,061       4,512       17,781     23,354     18           60           167         245         
Shan State (South) 10           58           1,732       1,800       222         355         5,126       5,703       59           64           364         487         814         1,926       22,187     24,927     34           26           173         232         
Mon State 58           120         1,600       1,778       485         902         4,848       6,235       131         397         1,136       1,664       7,026       4,370       18,416     29,812     26           25           112         163         
Tanithayi Division 70           56           797         923         1,300       290         2,056       3,646       66           53           64           182         13,809     1,982       6,758       22,549     98           14           48           160         
Rakhine State 58           76           775         909         984         521         2,356       3,861       526         139         163         828         8,518       3,042       9,850       21,410     126         16           54           196         
Kachin State 9             71           701         781         99           470         2,215       2,784       11           171         147         329         642         2,688       10,711     14,041     5             17           49           71           
Shan State (North) 15           43           589         647         333         263         1,743       2,339       89           47           159         295         1,221       1,428       7,545       10,194     51           19           59           128         
Kayin State 20           16           387         423         249         96           1,188       1,533       78           42           159         278         2,460       548         5,100       8,108       17           2             23           43           
Chin State -          2             399         401         -          12           1,097       1,109       -          -          52           52           -          57           3,391       3,448       -          -          16           16           
Kayah State 3             26           209         238         39           130         798         967         4             37           75           117         332         876         2,493       3,701       2             6             29           37           
Total 1,821       4,170       30,161     36,152     46,472     35,560     109,121   191,153   12,355     8,782       12,073     33,209     172,311   130,585   364,069   666,965   4,656       2,562       4,327       11,544     
?Source?DISI, Ministry of Industry (1).
No of factories No of employees Production (Million Kyats) Power (HP) Investment (Million Kyats)
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Regarding this statistic, a "large-scale plant" is defined as one that satisfies at least one of 
the following conditions: (1) an amount of investment in excess of 5 million Kyat (about 
10,000 US dollars at the then prevailing exchange rate), (2) yearly production output of over 
10 million Kyat (about 20,000 US dollars), (3) power equipment of 50HP or higher, or (4) 
more than 100 employees. This means that they include plant sizes equivalent to those of 
medium- and small-scale enterprises in Japan. In addition, there are a number of large-scale 
plants owned by entrepreneurs or operated as family businesses that function like small- or 
medium-scale enterprises in the sense that decision making is mostly non-systematic and done 
by owners only. Therefore, it is doubtful whether it is really meaningful to classify private 
manufacturing enterprises into those of large-, medium- or small-scale according to the 
government's criteria. 
Let us return to Table 14 and look at the features of size distribution in different states and 
divisions. As a specific feature, 40% of large-scale plants are located in the Yangon Division, 
followed by Mandalay (20%), Bago (13%), and Ayeyarwaddy (9%). In other areas, there are 
virtually no large-scale plants. With regard to medium-scale plants, Mandalay Division has 
about 30%, followed by Yangon (24%), Ayeyarwaddy (14%) and Bago (11%). As a feature of 
size distribution, a number of large-scale enterprises can be seen to be located in the periphery 
of Yangon while medium-scale enterprises are located in Mandalay. 
In reflection of this situation, plants in Yangon Division account for 26% of the total 
number of employees, 30% of production output, and 37% of total investment. In almost all 
aspects, Yangon is ahead of Mandalay. In this sense, Yangon (not Mandalay) may be the 
largest center of private industries in the country. 
As of March 2000, in Yangon Division, more than half of all workers were employed at 
large-scale plants. This is in sharp contrast to the situation in other divisions and states where 
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worker absorbing capacity is at its highest at small-scale plants. From the viewpoint of size 
distribution, Yangon is quite different from other areas. 
As the number of such large-scale plants increases in and around Yangon, it is anticipated 
that various management problems (labor relations management in particular) will emerge in 
the future. This requires that the managerial capabilities of private entrepreneurs who head 
small- and medium-scale enterprises be improved. In a country where the organization of 
labor unions is generally prohibited, a mechanism to adjust and mediate industrial relations 
and labor management will also be necessary. The government must devise and provide a fair 
and efficient system that will protect the rights and safety of workers, but must also ensure 
that it does not discourage investment from private businessmen. 
 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This paper outlined a series of open-door and market-oriented policies implemented under 
the military government (SLORC/SPDC) of Myanmar, and assessed their impact on industrial 
structural and spatial changes. Major economic indicators did not show either significant 
structural changes or spatial distributional changes in Myanmar’s industries. The country can 
still be described as a predominantly agricultural economy and one which extracts natural 
resources such as timber, gems, and oil and gas. 
Nevertheless, we observed the resilience and vitality of the private sector in Myanmar; it 
has positively and swiftly reacted to market-oriented policy and penetrating into fields where 
the market economy has revived. Given the opportunity, the private sector is ready to assume 
a more significant role in the national economy. This situation differs with some other 
transitional economies where lack of entrepreneurship seriously hinders the private sector 
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from taking a more prominent role in economic development. In contrast, Myanmar has the 
big advantage of having entrepreneurs of ability and vitality who could make its transition 
toward a market-oriented economy much easier and smoother. The players are ready. 
Therefore, public policy is important in whether or not it can make the most use of such 
players in economic development. Then the question comes back to the one previously posed: 
Can we be fully confident of the present government’s commitment on transition to a genuine 
market economy which guarantees a level playing field for all economic actors? 
Here again, we should look back at Myanmar’s history on industrial policy. Every 
government to date since independence, whether civilian or military, democratic or socialist, 
has approached the problem of the private sector with great concern and trepidation. 
Whenever the accommodation and integration of the energy of private enterprises into the 
national economy was contemplated, the socialist philosophy, anti-capitalist attitude, 
control-prone disposition, and xenophobia based on the bitter colonial experiences provided 
obstacles, resulting in the redefinition of the role of the private sector being left vague and 
incomplete. 
The transition to a market-oriented economy since the late 1980s was an historical 
exception. The various reform measures taken by the military government showed their 
apparent strong commitment toward a market economy. The author terms this present 
transformation of the economy the Third Wave, and feels assured that it is the biggest wave of 
liberalization in Myanmar's industrial history. Compared with the previous two waves, which 
the author believes occurred in the latter half of the 1950s and in the mid-1970s, the present 
regime had committed itself much more clearly to market economic principles and an 
enhanced role for the private sector. 
During the period of the military regime from 1988 until now, there have been two periods; 
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from 1988 to 1997 under SLORC, when there were good signs of openness and for the 
country to be a market economy; and the later years under SPDC, in which the government 
applied a restricted economic system which can be deemed a control-oriented market 
economy. Under this system, economic and trade policy was very tight, with the stagnant 
inflow of foreign direct investment, especially in the industrial and trade sectors. However, 
the government allowed their cronies and family members of generals and the government to 
engage in lucrative businesses. No laws, directives, or notifications were officially announced 
but new policies or orders were proclaimed with reference to the meeting minutes of the 
Trade Council. Although the industrial sector seems to have developed to some extent, in 
terms of numbers and size, it is only in line with growing population and consumption. Many 
businesses in the industrial sector and properties remain in the hands of the elite and powerful 
groups. 
Since 1995 and the implementation of a plan of privatization, Myanmar has been 
privatizing more and more state-owned enterprises to improve their operation. According to 
compiled statistics, out of 288 state-owned entities, a total of 254 proposed by 10 ministries 
have been privatized. The Myanmar Privatization Commission adopted the privatization plan 
in a bid to systematically turn enterprises nationalized in the 1960s into more effective 
enterprises. The plan was carried out by auctioning and leasing or establishing joint ventures 
with local and foreign investors. Enterprises covered by the plan included textile factories, 
saw mills, cinemas, and hotels. 
After the government moved to the new capital of Naypyitaw in 2005, the administration 
formed another committee in June 2007 for auctioning off surplus state-owned buildings in 
the former capital of Yangon. In 2009, the privatization program was accelerated for 
properties such as SEEs office buildings, warehouses, and factories. The Privatization 
53 
 
Commission chaired by the Secretary (1) of the SPDC announced the privatization of 91 
establishments in 2008, 302 in 2009, and 110 in 2010. Apart from the selling off of state 
properties, state-owned factories manufacturing motor vehicles will also be privatized. 
Futures plans for privatization include the transfer of management and properties to the 
private sector for many sectors such as port services, fuel distribution, electricity, and 
telecommunication services. This is a good sign for Myanmar’s economy and its further 
industrial development through the privatization program. 
Nevertheless, history still cautions against full confidence in government policy toward a 
market economy. It would be necessary for the military government to commit itself again to 
such ideas as open markets, free competition, transparency, accountability, consistency, a level 
playing field, freedom of information, and rule of law, which are the foundations for a free 
and fair market-oriented economy. Without the government’s commitment to those ideas, the 
private sector could never be confident regarding public policies, and as a result, full-fledged 
investment would never be forthcoming to develop the country into an industrialized modern 
nation. 
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